Introduction
Network airlines have increasingly concentrated their flights in a small number of airports that they dominate and from which they operate their hub-and-spoke routes. By adopting this strategy they are able to reduce their costs, through the exploitation of density economies, and they can offer higher flight frequencies, which are highly valued by business and connecting passengers. 1 While competition between network airlines operating at different hubs to attract connecting passengers may be intense, at their own hub airports the airlines have typically benefited from a rather weak competition with low-cost airlines.
However, in Europe, network airlines are increasingly concerned by the expansion of the operations of low-cost carriers at their operating bases. For example, the current financial distress being faced by Iberia and Alitalia is, in part, attributable to competition from low-cost airlines operating in Madrid and Rome-FCO airports, respectively. KLM has been forced to operate with a low-cost subsidiary on many routes out of Amsterdam, while the bankruptcy of Malev can be explained in part by the success of low-cost airlines operating from Budapest. More generally, in the period 2002-2013, the network airlines' share has fallen in 17 of 22 large European airports that have traditionally been dominated by former flag carriers (see details in Table 1 ).
A loss in the competitiveness of the dominant network airlines may have a markedly negative impact on their respective hub airports. The dominance of the network airlines has benefitted the airports and their corresponding urban areas in a number of ways. The traffic is higher than that generated solely by local demand because a large proportion of passengers in hub airports are connecting passengers.
2 Furthermore, the geographical scope of non-stop destinations is especially high at hub airports. 3 In this regard, several studies have shown that air traffic services have a strong influence on firms' location choices (Brueckner, 2003; Green, 2007; Bel and Fageda, 2008; Bilotkach, 2013) .
However, airport dominance and high route concentration may lead to higher average air fares, as has been well documented in the literature. Without intending to be exhaustive, this is a conclusion reported in Borenstein (1989) , Brander and Zhang (1990) , Brueckner et al. (1992) , 1 It is generally accepted that the route operations of airlines are subject to density economies (Brueckner and Spiller, 1994) , and that airlines can attract more connecting passengers in a hub-and-spoke structure by increasing service frequency than by increasing aircraft size (Wei and Hansen, 2006) . 2 Systematic data for the proportion of connecting passengers at Europe's large airports are not readily available. However, Urban Audit data for 2007 provide the following figures for major hubs: London-LHR: 35%; Frankfurt-FRA: 54%; Amsterdam-AMS: 42%; Paris-CDG: 32%. 3 In Europe, only hub airports offer a significant number of non-stop flights to intercontinental destinations, and it is unlikely that low-cost airlines can replicate their business model in the long-haul sector (Francis et al., 2007) .
context, the objective of this paper is not to examine the welfare implications of the entry of lowcost airlines in hub airports. Our aim is to determine which dimensions of competition might undermine the competitive position of dominant airlines at hub airports. In particular, we want to examine whether network airlines must reduce frequencies at their hubs when they are competing with low-cost airlines.
We estimate an equation in which the dependent variable is the frequencies offered by
European network airlines on routes departing from their hub airports, using data for the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . Specifically, we seek to address the question of whether competition takes place at the route, airport and/or city-pair levels. Furthermore, we seek to disentangle whether what actually matters is the overall degree of competition or the identity of the competitor (that is, network or low-cost airlines). We identify the competitive position of each airline by the flight frequencies they are able to provide on a given route. Flight frequency is typically considered the main attribute of air service quality as it determines the schedule delay cost, i.e., the difference between the desired and actual time of departure.
Our contribution is set in the context of the literature on airline frequency competition at the route level, defining a route as the link between two airports. Previous studies examining the determinants of airline frequencies have focused primarily on route competition (Schipper et al., 2002; Richard, 2003; Pai, 2010; Bilotkach et al., 2010 Bilotkach et al., , 2013 Brueckner and Luo, 2013) . Indeed, these studies use as indicators of competition the route concentration index, the presence of lowcost airlines on the route and whether the airport is a hub or not. We add to this literature by examining the impact on frequencies of competition at the airport level using as additional indicators of competition the airport concentration index and the share of low-cost carriers in the airport. Furthermore, we also consider the impact of competition at the city-pair level by including as explanatory variable of frequencies the number of flights offered by low-cost airlines from Document de Treball 2014 /14, pàg. 6 Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2014 6 secondary airports in the same city-pair market. Finally, we also provide evidence about the effect of mergers on frequencies offered by the smaller airline in Europe.
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Additionally, some studies have analyzed the impact of low-cost airlines on price and capacity competition but less evidence has been found regarding their impact on service levels in hub-andspoke structures. An important difference with previous studies on airline competition is that we put exclusively the attention on choices of network airlines at their hub airports.
In this regard, Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) examine the responses of incumbent US airlines to the threat of entry of Southwest using a sample of routes between 59 airports that Southwest ever flies any flights in 1993-2004. They define the threat of entry on a route in those cases where Southwest is offering flights in both endpoint airports of the route but not on the route. They find that incumbents reduce prices when Southwest threatens a route but this fare cuts are not accompanied with an increase of frequencies or seats. Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) also examine passenger traffic when Southwest threatens entry to metropolitan area's secondary airport and they did not find significant results. While the study of Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) examined whether the mere presence of Southwest in both endpoints (or in a nearby airport) of the route influence the behavior of the incumbent airline in the route, we examine the impact of a higher share of low-cost airlines in the origin (hub) airports and the influence of the amount of flights offered by low-cost airlines from secondary airports.
Another study that is closely related with this paper is to Bettini and Oliveira (2008) . They analyze the determinants of major carrier's capacity in routes connecting the 30 biggest Brazilian airports, including as explanatory variables a dummy for those routes in which Gol is offering flights and a dummy for those routes that have as endpoint a city with two commercial airports.
They found positive effects of low-cost entry and negative effects of the variable for adjacent airports on major carrier's capacity. While the focus of the study of Bettini and Oliveira (2008) is about the effects of a low-cost airline offering flights in the route or not and whether the city is served by two commercial airports, we provide evidence on the effects of a higher share of lowcost airlines in both the route and the origin airport and of the amount of flights offered by lowcost airlines from secondary airports.
It should be stressed that most empirical studies of airline competition have been conducted for the US market, for which data availability is much better. In this paper, however, we provide evidence of competition between network and low-cost airlines for a large sample of European airports. To this point, note that we also provide evidence of the impact of mergers on the hubs of the smaller airline in Europe. In this regard, Bilotkach et al. (2013) show that the merger of Delta 7
and Northwest led to a re-organization of the route structure in favor of the hubs of the larger airline.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain the data used in the empirical analysis and the criteria applied in building the sample and variables. Then, we specify the empirical model and state our expectations for each explanatory variable. The following section deals with various econometric issues and reports the regression results. The last section contains our concluding remarks.
Data
The empirical analysis draws on route-level data from large airports in the European Union (as well as Norway and Switzerland) and covers a period that extends from 2002 through 2013. We include the large European airports at which the same airline was dominant throughout the period of study and at which that dominant airline was not a low-cost carrier. Following these criteria, A number of large European airports are not included in the analysis because we were unable to identify one dominant airline operating out of them for the whole period. For example, the bankruptcy of Malev in 2011 prevents us from including Budapest, while the de-hubbing of Alitalia from Milan-MXP has meant that Alitalia has operated very few flights at this airport since 2011. 4 Likewise, it has proved impossible to determine whether Olympic Airlines or Aegean was the dominant airline in Athens, while Manchester has had a highly diversified pool of airlines offering flights with no single company accounting for a share of more than 10 per cent, and various airlines have been dominant in the period in Barcelona (Iberia, Clickair and Vueling).
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Other airports, such as Palma de Mallorca, Berlin-TXL and London (LTN, STN), are not included because they are dominated by low-cost carriers. Document de Treball 2014 /14, pàg. 8 Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2014 8 However, it should be pointed out that not all the airports included in our sample can be unequivocally classified as hub airports throughout the whole period. 6 Specifically, British
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Airways has been progressively reducing its traffic at London-LGW, but it continues to account for around 18 per cent of the total flights at this airport. According to data from the UK Civil Aviation Authority, the share of connecting passengers at LGW is still higher than 10 per cent.
The exclusion of important European airports from our sample is a limitation but the aim of the analysis we conduct is to determine the influence of different attributes of competition on the hub operations of network airlines. In this regard, our restricted sample covers a very high proportion of all hub operations undertaken by network airlines at Europe's airports.
We have been able to collect complete data for 952 routes on which the airlines under consideration provided an air service in all the years of the period studied (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) Airline frequency data at the route and airport level have been obtained from RDC aviation (Capstats statistics), while route distance data are taken from the Official Airline Guide (OAG).
We have aggregated supply data that contains information on the frequencies provided by the airline on the route (from airport i to airport j). This is a major limitation of our data because we are not able to make the distinction between passengers that fly to the hub airport as final destination and connecting passengers. To this point, we would like to remark that the contribution of this paper is set in the context of the literature of airline frequency competition at the route level, defining a route as the link between two airports. This being said, results of our analysis should be complemented with studies that use origin and destination data of passengers.
Note we use explanatory variables that distinguish between two types of airlines: 1) Network airlines: Airlines integrated in international alliances (Oneworld, Star Alliance and SkyTeam) and/or former flag carriers of the respective countries of the airports of origin in our sample, and 2) Non-network airlines: airlines that are not former flag carriers and which are not integrated in alliances. Thus, our approach distinguishes between airlines that exploit connecting traffic at
European airports as an essential part of their business and airlines that focus their business on point-to-point routes. By drawing this distinction, we are able to avoid the complex task of having to draw up a list of low-cost carriers without comprehensive data regarding airline costs.
In the case of the European Union, former flag carriers can be considered to be network airlines regardless of whether they are integrated in international alliances or not. 7 Taking this into account, most airlines not integrated in such alliances and which provide services on intraEuropean routes concentrate their business on point-to-point routes. Some exceptions do exist, especially on certain intercontinental routes where airlines such as Emirates or Air Transat offer services, but their aggregated impact is modest. In any case, the criterion employed allows us to distinguish between airlines that operate hub-and-spoke routes and those that operate point-topoint routes, especially in the case of intra-European routes.
We also consider whether the dominant airline has been involved in a merger with a larger company. In our sample, the airlines involved in such mergers are KLM ( Finally, we include a variable that examines the influence of low-cost airlines operating from a nearby secondary airport. Hence, we include a variable that identifies the number of flights offered by low-cost airlines from an airport that is less than 100 kilometers from the city center of the These airlines have generally operated strategic partnerships with other network airlines when they have not been members of alliances. In this regard, we made some regressions using a dummy variable for observations in which the dominant airline was not integrated in an alliance and the variable presented a high degree of non-statistical significance.
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Working Paper 2014/14, pag. 10 airport of origin in our sample. We compute the frequencies offered by low-cost airlines in the same city-pair market as that of the dominant airline in the airports in our sample. For example, SN Brussels offers flights on the Brussels-Manchester route and Ryanair also provides a service to
Manchester from Brussels-Charleroi. In our sample, the secondary airports at which low cost airlines enjoy a considerable presence are Baneasa, Charleroi, Skavasta, Beauvais, Stansted, Luton, Ciampino, Weeze, Bratislava and Moss. Ryanair has currently a leading position in most of them except in Baneasa and Luton where the leading airlines are Wizzair and Easyjet, respectively. Table 1 reports data about the airline structure for the sample airports. The mean traffic share of the dominant airline is in all circumstances higher than 30 per cent and in some cases as high as 60 per cent. Here, the dominance of the leading airlines at some airports has been strengthened while in other it has weakened. In particular, the share of the dominant airline has been reduced in 14 Overall, the airports considered here present great variation in the evolution of their traffic and in the respective shares attributed to the different airlines operating out of them. Yet, what seems clear is the trend towards an increase in the presence of airlines not integrated in an alliance in many airports that were previously controlled by former flag carriers. This is quite remarkable if we consider that our sample of airports excludes those that are the home base of a low-cost Document de Treball 2014 /14, pàg. 11 Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2014 airline. 8 While it is not clear the aggregated effect of the increasing presence of non-network airlines at European hub airports, they may have weakened the dominance of the former flag carriers. In the following sections, we focus the attention on competition between network and low-cost airlines operating from hub airports.
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In this equation, the dependent variable is the total number of annual flights offered by the dominant airline on route k in year t. As explanatory variables, we include variables that measure the population and per capita income of the destination in order to control for demand. We expect airlines to offer higher frequencies on routes that link richer and more populous cities.
We also take into account the influence of the route's distance, calculated as the number of kilometers flown to link the route's endpoints. Airlines may prefer to use smaller planes at higher frequencies on short-haul routes. Thus, we would expect a negative relationship between distance and frequency as it has been found in Pai (2010) or Bilotkach et al. (2010) .
Additionally, we include dummies for intra-European routes and routes to the United States for the period after the EU-US open skies agreement was signed. Controlling for other factors, demand on intra-European routes might be higher as a result of the greater degree of integration of Unfortunately, our data only provide information of the airline that is effectively operating the flight so that we do not know whether other airlines are involved in the route through code-share agreements. Taking this into account, we include a variable that may work as a proxy for the effects of code-share agreements. Indeed, we include a dummy that takes the value one for those routes that connects two hubs of airlines integrated in the same alliance.
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While code-share agreements may be set between airlines in different scenarios, one of the main areas of coordination of airlines integrated in an alliance has to do with the code-share agreements. Hence, it is sensible to argue that the likelihood that the dominant airline has codeshare agreements with other airlines at its hubs is higher in those routes that that have the hub of another airline in the same alliance as destination. We expect a negative sign for the coefficient associated with this variable because additional flights in the route may be offered by code-share partners of the dominant airline.
As we mention above, a limitation of our data is that we just have aggregated supply information on the frequencies provided by the airline on the route. Taking into account the limitations of our data, we include a variable that may capture part of the effect of inter-hub competition on the frequencies offered by the dominant airline in the corresponding route. This variable is constructed as the number of airports in the sample that have direct flights to the route's destination in the considered year. It is not clear the expected sign for the coefficient associated with this variable. One the one hand, more airports serving the destination of the route may have a negative effect on frequencies of the dominant airline in its hub due to stronger competition coming from network airlines in other hubs. On the other hand, more airports serving the destination could be indicating higher demand of flights to such destination which is not captured by the other explanatory variables.
Furthermore, we consider a dummy variable that takes a value of one for routes and periods in which the dominant airline at the airport was acquired by another larger airline. Following the Document de Treball 2014 /14, pàg. 13 Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2014 13 merger, a reorganization of the route network might have been implemented in favor of the airports of the larger airline . Hence, we expect a negative sign for the coefficient associated with this variable.
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The main focus of our analysis is on the competition variables. An important difference with previous studies on airline competition is that we put exclusively the attention on choices of network airlines at their hub airports. Under hub-and-spoke structures, the service levels of airlines in the route will depend on the amount of traffic related with direct and connecting passengers.
Taking this into account, we include the following variables as indicators of competition at the route, airport and city-pair level.
We include two variables that seek to capture competition at the route level. First, we consider the route concentration, measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, in terms of flight frequencies. In addition to route concentration, we consider a variable that identifies the share of non-network airlines on the route. The expected sign of the coefficient associated with these variables is not a priori clear A typical strategy of an incumbent airline against the entry of rivals in a route is to cut fares and add flights to boost demand. Hence, we could expect a negative relationship between frequencies and route concentration as it has been found in Bilotkach et al. (2010 Bilotkach et al. ( , 2013 ) and a positive effect of entry of a low-cost airline in a route as it has been found in Bettini and Oliveira (2008) . Indeed, incumbents may compensate a loss in demand with proper pricing tactics.
Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), for example, do not find any negative demand effect on legacy carriers due to the entry of Southwest Airlines in the US market.
However, the entry of low-cost carriers in our context may also have negative effects on frequencies of network airlines in a route. While a network airline operate under a hub-and-spoke structure, low-cost airlines operate under a point-to-point structure. Hence, network airlines are likely competing with low-cost airlines with different cost structures and different quality standards so that they could have to set higher prices. Thus, the entry of a low-cost airline in a route may imply less demand coming from direct passengers and a possible reaction of the incumbent airline to lower direct traffic is to reduce frequencies.
We include two additional variables as explanatory factors: the Herfindahl-Hirschman index in terms of airline frequencies at the airport level, and the share that non-network airlines have at the airport. The expected sign of the coefficient associated with these variables is not a priori clear.
As we have explained above, network airlines at their hubs can react by increasing or decreasing frequencies when route competition is more intense. The variation in frequencies Note that competition between airlines integrated in the same alliance may be weak (in fact, they usually operate code-share agreements) and other airlines (other than the dominant one)
operating hub-and-spoke networks frequently use the airport under consideration to feed their hubs. In such circumstances, frequencies of the dominant airline may be especially affected by competing airlines that operate point-to-point routes, because these airlines are more likely to be disputing the passengers with final destination at the airport under consideration by means of aggressive offers.
Furthermore, we include a variable that identifies the number of flights offered by low-cost airlines in the same city-pair market from a nearby secondary airport. Again, the expected sign of the coefficient associated with this variable is not a priori clear. The network airline could react to the entry of low-cost airlines in the same city-pair market by cutting fares and increasing frequencies. However, demand of the dominant airline at the large airport could be substantially affected by competition from low-cost airlines operating at the nearby airport. Note that it might also be the case that city-pair markets that are connected via different airports are particularly dense corridors whose demand is not fully controlled by our explanatory variables. Finally, it should be also taken into account that most of airports in our sample are slot-constrained airports so that network carriers could not be able to change frequencies in reaction to low-cost airlines entry in secondary airports because they would lose slots.
Finally, we include dummies for the airports of origin and year and İ kt is a mean-zero random error term. The airport dummies control for time-invariant airport-specific omitted variables, while the year dummies control for the common trend on all routes in the dataset. Specifically, airport and time fixed effects may help to control for relevant factors for which, unfortunately, we have no available data. Indeed, one potential omitted variable in our empirical model is airport congestion. This being said, the use of airport dummies may help in controlling its effect because some airports are systematically more congested than others, and the use of year dummies may also be helpful because the relevance of congestion is higher in boom periods. However, we must recognize that a potential limitation of our analysis is that we are not able to control explicitly for airport congestion.
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Estimation and results
In this section, we deal with a number of econometric issues and discuss the results of the regressions. The estimates may present non-stationarity and temporal autocorrelation problems.
We apply the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data. Under the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation, the residuals from the regression of the first-differenced variables should have an autocorrelation of -0.5. This implies that the coefficient on the lagged residuals in a regression of the lagged residuals on the current residuals should be -0.5 (see Wooldridge, 2002 for further details). The Wooldridge test shows that we may have a problem of serial autocorrelation, which must be addressed. We also apply the panel unit root test developed by Levin et al. (2002) , which can be regarded as an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test when lags are included with the null hypothesis of nonstationarity I(1) behavior. This test with one lag indicates that there is no non-stationarity problem with our dependent variable.
We perform the estimation using two different techniques that take advantage of the panel nature of our data: the route fixed and random effects models. The use of any of the two models allows us to consider unobserved route heterogeneity.
An advantage of the fixed effects model is that it allows us to control for any omitted variables that correlate with the variables of interest and which do not change over time. As such, the fixed effects model is more reliable than other estimation techniques. A shortcoming of the fixed effects model is that it may be less informative than other techniques because the effect of time-invariant variables cannot be identified. Indeed, the random effects model has the advantage that it may capture both the between and the within variation of the data while the fixed effect model only captures the within variation of the data. However, a disadvantage of the random effects model is related with the potential bias derived from the correlation between the explanatory variables and the random effects.
The Hausman test shows the existence of substantial differences between the random and the fixed effects. An important reason why the two estimators could be different is the existence of correlation between the explanatory variables and the random effects, although other sorts of misspecification may also read to rejection (Verbeek, 2000) . For example, the fixed effects estimator may be particularly imprecise when several explanatory variables are rarely changing or not changing at all. In this regard, some studies have applied Monte Carlo simulations to show that the Hausman test may be misleading when the variables used in the empirical analysis have a low within variation (Clark and Linzer, 2012; Troeger, 2008) . Document de Treball 2014 /14, pàg. 16 Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2014 In our model, many explanatory variables are either time-invariant or have a low withinvariation. However, the results of the Hausman test do not allow us to be confident with the random effects model. Hence, what we have opted to do is to present the results using both the random and fixed effects models assuming an AR(1) process in the error term and standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity.
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Airlines do not change flight frequency very frequently and therefore current shocks in capacity allocation could be expected to be passed to the future observations. Hence, we could consider including the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. To this point, note that several previous studies like the one of Bettini and Oliveira (2008) uses quarterly data, while we use annual data. This may help to overcome the potential inertia in frequency data. In our context, the use of a dynamic model would require us to first differentiate all variables due to the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals and the fact that we have a large number of cross-sections in relation to the time periods. We have experimented with dynamic regressions and almost all explanatory variables are not statistically significant. This may be a consequence of the low
within-variation (or not variation at all) of many explanatory variables
An additional issue that must be addressed is the potential endogeneity of the concentration variables. To deal with this, we include a one-year lag of the concentration variables as explanatory variables. It is difficult to make a case for the correlation between lagged concentration and current unobserved shocks. We also experimented with additional lags of these variables and the results are not affected. In order to simplify the presentation of our results, we only report the results of regressions with a one-year lag of the concentration variables.
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We make the estimation using all the observations and for the different subsamples.
Specifically, we distinguish between intra-EU routes and routes that link the airports of origin in our sample with non-EU destinations. Population and per capita income data are richer in the case of the intra-European routes and the distinction between network and non-network airlines operating on the route is clearer in the case of the intra-EU routes. Furthermore, we may find a high variability in the regulatory regimes of routes with non-EU destinations.
In the case of intra-EU routes, we report results of an additional regression in which we exclude those routes with presence of low-cost subsidiaries of the dominant airline. The presence of low-11 All variables of competition could be exposed to an endogeneity bias in case that we were not able to capture appropriately the intensity of competition that low-cost airlines exert from secondary airports. In this regard, the variable of number of flights offered by low-cost airlines from secondary airports should help in mitigating such potential bias in our regressions. Document de Treball 2014 /14, pàg. 17 Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2014 cost subsidiaries in a route may distort our competition analysis. 12 We also distinguish between short-haul and long-haul routes. Thus, we estimate our equation for routes shorter and longer than the mean distance for intra-EU routes, which is about 900 kilometers.
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In short, we make the estimation using these samples: 1) all routes, 2) all intra-EU routes, 3) intra-EU routes excluding routes with presence of low-cost subsidiaries of the dominant airline, 4) intra-EU routes of less than 900 kilometers, 5) intra-EU routes of more than 900 kilometers. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis, while Table 4 presents the correlation matrix of these variables. It can be seen that all the variables present sufficient variability, as the standard deviation is high in relation to the mean values. In the case of the correlation matrix, it is notable that the correlation between the concentration variables and those that reflect the presence of non-network competitors is sufficiently low for us to be able to identify the specific effects of each variable. Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the estimates when using the random and fixed effects model, respectively. As explained above, the fixed effects model is not able to capture the effect of time-invariant variables and the within-variation of several explanatory variables is low. This explains why the overall explanatory power of the model is considerably higher in the regressions that use random effects and why more explanatory variables are statistically significant with the use of random effects.
Insert table 3 about here

Insert table 4 about here
Insert table 5 about here
Insert table 6 about here
In the regressions that use the random effects model, the control variables, in general, work as expected. The frequencies of the dominant airline are higher when the route links more populous and richer endpoints. The fixed effects model does not seem to capture the impact of these control variables as it concentrates on the within-variation of data. Furthermore, we find a negative relationship between frequencies and distance in the regressions that can be identified.
The coefficient associated with the dummy variable for intra-EU routes is positive and statistically significant in the regressions that can be identified. As expected, frequencies on intra-12 Several low-cost subsidiaries of network carriers have their main base in airports away from the main hubs of the dominant airline as it is the case of Germanwings with the main base in Cologne, Vueling/Clickair with the main base in Barcelona or Air One which is mainly placed in tourist Italian destinations. However, some observations are affected by the presence of low-cost subsidiaries of the dominant airline, particularly several routes from Amsterdam, Madrid and Munich with presence of Transavia, Vueling and Germanwings, respectively.
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Working Paper 2014/14, pag. 18 18 EU routes are higher due to greater demand in a geographical area characterized by no regulatory restrictions and strong economic integration. Interestingly, the frequencies of the dominant airline have fallen after the open skies agreement was introduced on routes to US destinations, but the effect is not statistically significant. Overall, it is not clear from our results that former European flag-carriers have been exposed to more intense competition in the EU-US market after the open skies agreement came into force.
The coefficient associated with the dummy variable for routes that connect two hubs of airlines integrated in the same alliance is negative in all regressions but it is generally not statistically significant. Thus, we found no clear differences between routes more or less likely to be affected by code-share agreements. The coefficient associated with the variable for hub competition is positive and statistically significant in the random effects regressions but not statistically significant and with different sign in the fixed effects regressions. Hence, we cannot reach definitive conclusions regarding this variable.
We also find that the frequencies of dominant airlines are lower in the period following their merger with a larger airline. The coefficient associated with this variable is always negative (although it is more clearly significant in the regressions that use the fixed effects model). Overall, we find some evidence for Europe that mergers may imply a re-organization of the route structure in favor of the hubs of the larger airline (see Bilotkach et al., 2013 , for an analysis with similar results for the US airline market).
At the route level, the coefficient of the route concentration variable is not statistically significant in any regression. On the contrary, the coefficient associated with the variable for share of non-network competitors is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in all the regressions. This is in contrast with the results in Bilotkach et al. (2010 Bilotkach et al. ( , 2013 ) that find a negative relationship between frequencies and route concentration and they also differ with results of Bettini and Oliveira (2008) that found a positive effect on incumbent's capacity of entry of a lowcost airline in a route. Recall that an important difference with previous studies is that we put exclusively the attention on choices of network airlines at their hub airports.
At the airport level, the coefficient of the variable of airport concentration is positive in all the regressions. However, the statistical significance varies depending on the regression. It is generally not statistically significant in the regressions that use fixed effects and it is generally statistically significant at the 5% or 10% level in the regressions that use the random effects model. Notably, the coefficient associated with the variable of the share of non-network airlines at European airports is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in all the regressions. Document de Treball 2014 /14, pàg. 19 Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2014 Overall, the picture is quite clear and the outcomes are similar in the random and fixed effects regressions. The impact of the variables for non-network competitors is stronger than that of the concentration variables. This is true when we look at both route and airport indicators of competition.
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Dominant airlines reduce frequencies in routes departing from their hubs when the share of low-cost airlines in those routes is higher. In our sample, network airlines at their hubs do not seem to follow the strategy of cutting fares and increase frequencies against the entry of low-cost airlines. The reduction in frequencies by dominant airlines may be a consequence of lower demand coming from direct passengers. To this point, recall that a major limitation of our data is that we are not able to make the distinction between passengers that fly to the hub airport as final destination and connecting passengers. While we consider that results that we find for the variable of share of non-network airlines in the hub airports has to do with demand of connecting passengers, our analysis should be complemented with empirical exercises using origin and destination data of passengers.
We do not find evidence that competition from low-cost airlines operating out of secondary airports has a clear impact on frequencies of dominant airlines considered here. 13 The coefficient associated with the variable of frequencies of low-cost airlines in nearby secondary airports is generally positive in the regressions that use the random effects model and generally negative in the regressions that use the fixed effects model. This being said, it is not statistically significant in all the regressions that use fixed effects and it is not statistically significant in the regressions that use random effects for EU routes that not differentiate by route distance. Hence, results of our analysis for the variable of secondary airports are similar to those obtained by Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) while they differ from results obtained by Bettini and Oliveira (2008) . Document de Treball 2014 /14, pàg. 20 Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2014 20 Note that Ryanair is the airline that typically operates in secondary nearby facilities of hub airports. It could be that Ryanair and former flag carriers attract different types of passenger, so that the leading low-cost airline in Europe is in fact fighting for more price-sensitive passengers.
Furthermore, most of airports in our sample are slot-constrained airports so that network carriers may not be willing to change frequencies in reaction to low-cost airlines entry in secondary airports because they would lose slots.
Overall, our empirical analysis indicates that dominant airlines may be worried by the increased presence of non-network airlines at their hub airports but they should not be concerned by an expansion of operations of low-cost airlines in secondary nearby airports. Critically, the negative effects suffered by dominant airlines as a result of the stronger presence of non-network airlines at their operating bases are not only felt on the routes on which they compete directly with each other, but also on other routes that may suffer a reduction in demand from connecting passengers.
Concluding remarks
The main contribution of this paper has been to show that network airlines at their hubs reduce frequencies when the share of low-cost airlines increases both on the route and at the hub airport.
On the contrary, frequency choices of network airlines at their hubs do not seem to be affected by competition from low-cost airlines operating in nearby secondary airports. We also find some evidence that mergers in Europe may result in a re-organization of the route structure in favor of the hubs of the larger airline.
Moreover, the impact of the variables for non-network competitors is stronger than that of the concentration variables. When we look at frequencies offered from dominant airlines at their hub airports, competition between network and low-cost airlines may be intense but our analysis suggest that competition between airlines in alliances seems to be relatively weak. Further analysis should disentangle the effect derived from airlines that are integrated in the same alliance as that of the hubbing airline from that derived from airlines in a different alliance.
A major limitation of our data is that we are not able to make the distinction between passengers that fly to the hub airport as final destination and connecting passengers. Hence, our analysis should be complemented with empirical studies using origin and destination data of passengers. Another potential limitation of our analysis is that we are not able to control explicitly for airport congestion. Further research could investigate the implications of flight delays in the competition between network and low-cost airlines. Document de Treball 2014 /14, pàg. 21 Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2014 21 From our analysis, it seems clear that the increasing presence of low-cost airlines in European hub airports has negative consequences for the network airlines that have traditionally dominated those hubs. However, this does not mean that the levels of service at the hub airport are worse when the share of low-cost airlines increases. In fact, it may be that there is only sufficient traffic to support a certain number of hub airports and network carriers. The US market has seen a reduction in the number of hubs and the number of network carriers over the last years. Europe has a large number of hubs and network carriers in a relatively limited geographic area, and this may not be a viable equilibrium in a more competitive environment. 
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